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Coordination and Consensus in Water
Resource Management
THOMAS E. SHEA*
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Justice Holmes said it well: "A river is more than an amenity, it
is a treasure."' This realization of the value of rivers can be equally
applied to all of the nation's waters. The management of these water
resources requires consideration of a variety of factors, including fish
and wildlife, commerce, recreation, economics, pollution and alloca-
tion. It is the nature of water resources for these and other interests to
be in competition with each other when decisions must be made. The
policies that guide these decisions are the result of an uneasy balance
among national, regional, state and local control. These policies are
also the product of a tug-of-war between developmental forces and en-
vironmentalists. While it would be an oversimplification to view water
resource policy solely as a struggle along these two axes, these have
been the main battlegrounds. It is unfortunate but true that the battle
analogy is appropriate. The fields of valor are legislatures and courts;
the warriors are ecologists, politicians, lawyers and businessmen of our
country. As the battle lines change and the strengths of the participants
ebb and flow, the management philosophy emerging from the fray has
developed.
* J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1976; M.A., Boise State University, 1974;
B.S., Regis College, 1972. Corporate Counsel, Commonwealth Companies Incorporated; former
District Counsel, Corps of Engineers.
1. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
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Beyond the underlying philosophy, however, is the process by which
water resource management decisions are made. This process, too, has
developed. Two of the fundamental concepts in this decision process
are coordination and consensus. Coordination is the process by which
a proposal is reviewed by parties other than the decision-making en-
tity.2 Its purpose is twofold. First, it enables the decision-maker to re-
ceive input from other sources, with the objective of better decisions.
Second, it opens up the decision process, allowing interested parties to
be informed concerning how the decision was made and the reasons for
the decision. Consensus is general agreement. Its purpose is to
achieve a decision that is satisfactory to all.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the concept and application
of coordination and consensus as they affect the management of water
resources by the Federal Government. This discussion will begin with
an exploration of several important federal laws that affect coordina-
tion or consensus of water resource management. Discussion of these
laws will then be followed by an exploration of the concept and appli-
cation of the mandate for coordination and the role of consensus in the
decision process.
THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT OF 1899
As early as 1824, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the Federal
Government to regulate the navigable waters of the country.4 Because
the Constitution does not specifically address itself to navigable waters,
this power is based upon the grant of the commerce clause, which al-
lows regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the sev-
eral states.5 There were, however, no federal statutes in the early days
of the country which prevented the obstruction of the nation's water-
ways, and in 1887 the Supreme Court, in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v.
Hatch,6 held that there was no common law of the United States which
prohibited such obstruction.7
In response to this decision, Congress enacted Section 10 of the Riv-
ers and Harbors Act of 1890,8 prohibiting the creation of any obstruc-
2. This meaning of coordination differs from the usual dictionary definition. The closest
definition the author has found is in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 501
(1971): "to bring into a common action, movement, or condition: regulate and combine in har-
monious action." As will be seen in this article, the coordination requirements of federal statutes
require consideration but do not necessarily mandate harmony.
3. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 482 (1971).
4. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
5. U.S. CONST., art. 1, §8, cl. 3.
6. 125 U.S. 1 (1888).
7. Id. at 8.
8. Harbors Act of 1890, c. 907, §10, 26 Stat. 454 (1890).
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tion to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States
unless affirmatively authorized. Nine years later the Congress passed a
compilation of laws affecting navigation in the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899. 9 The purpose of the Act is to protect navigation10 and the Act
has proven so effective that it remains essentially unchanged. The ju-
risdictional extent of that protection was limited to waters which were
navigable in fact."
Sections 9, 10, and 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act contain the
primary authority for federal regulation of the nation's navigable wa-
ters. Section 912 prohibits the construction of bridges, dams, dikes or
causeways over or in any navigable water until the consent of Congress
is obtained and until the plans have been approved by the Chief of
Engineers and the Secretary of the Army.1 3 The Act also provides that
9. 33 U.S.C. 402-16, 418 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The compilation of these laws was per-
formed by the Secretary of War at the request of Congress. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1896, c.
314, §2, 29 Stat. 202.
10. 32 CONG. REc. 2297 (1899).
11. In The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825), the Supreme Court
held that jurisdiction over libels arising under maritime contracts would lie only if performed
upon the sea or waters within the ebb and flow of the tide. This test was adopted from the English
common-law view of admiralty. The ebb and flow test was later rejected by the Court in The
Propeller Genessee Chiefv. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). The decision noted that the
common-law test made sense in England, where all the navigable-in-fact streams were also subject
to the ebb and flow of the tides, but that the test would be too limiting if applied in the United
States. In The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) the Supreme Court held that navigable
waters of the United States are those which form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by
uniting with other waters, a continuous highway over which commerce is or may be carried on
with other states or foreign countries in the customary modes. Today, for purposes of the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899, navigable waters of the United States are defined as those waters that
are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward to the mean high water mark, and/or are
resently used, or have been used in the past, or may be susceptible to use to transport interstate or
oreign commerce. 33 C.F.R. §322.2(a) (1980); see United States v. Appalachian Electric Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377, 409 (1940); Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 123
(1921); United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 610 (3d Cir. 1974).
12. 33 U.S.C. §401 (1976 Supp. III 1979).
It shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction of any bridge, dam,
dike, or causeway over or in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river,
or other navigable water of the United States until the consent of Congress to the build-
ing of such structures shall have been obtained and until the plans for the same shall
have been submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of
the Army: Provided, That such structures may be built under authority of the legislature
of a State across rivers and other waterways the navigable portions of which lie wholly
within the limits of a single State, provided the location and plans thereof are submitted
to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of the Army before
construction is commenced: And providedfurther, That when plans for any bridge or
other structure have been approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of the
Army, it shall not be lawful to deviate from such plans either before or after completion
of the structure unless the modification of said plans has previously been submitted to
and received the approval of the Chief of Engineers and of the Secretary of the Army.
Id.
13. The Secretary of the Army was substituted for the Secretary of War by §205(a) of the Act
of July 26, 1947, c. 343, Title II, 61 Stat. 501. All of the functions, powers and duties of the
Secretary of the Army and subordinate offices of the Department of the Army relating to the
location and clearance of bridges and causeways under this section were transferred to the Secre-
tary of Transportation by the Act which created the Department of Transportation, 49 U.S.C.
§1655(g)(6)(A) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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such structures may be built under authority of the state legislature
where the navigable portion of the waterway lies wholly within that
state and the plans are approved by the Chief of Engineers and the
Secretary of the Army. 4
Section 10 prohibits the creation of any obstruction to the navigable
capacity of any of the waters of the United States. 5 It provides that the
building of any structure in the waters of the United States, outside
established harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been estab-
lished, is unlawful except where the plans are recommended by the
Chief of Engineers and approved by the Secretary of the Army.' 6 Fi-
nally, Section 10 makes it unlawful to excavate or fill or in any manner
to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of naviga-
ble waters without a recommendation from the Chief of Engineers and
authorization by the Secretary of the Army. 7
Section 13, commonly known as the Refuse Act, makes it unlawful to
throw, discharge, or deposit, any refuse matter of any kind, other than
that flowing from streets and sewers, as a liquid into any navigable
water of the United States or its tributary.' 8 This section further pro-
14. 33 U.S.C. §401 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979).
15. Id §403:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the naviga-
ble capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall not be
lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir,
breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor,
canal, navigable river, or other water of the United States, outside established harbor
lines, or where no harbor lines have been established, except on plans recommended by
the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army; and it shall not be
lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course, location, condi-
tion, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor of refuge, or
inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of
the United States, unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and
authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same.
16. Id
17. Id
18. Id §407:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be
thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating
craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any
kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from
streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the
United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall
float or be washed into such navigable water;, and it shall not be lawful to deposit, or
cause, suffer, or procure to be deposited material of any kind in any place on the bank of
any navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the
same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high
tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded
or obstructed. Provided, That nothing herein contained shall extend to, apply to, or pro-
hibit the operation in connection with the improvement of navigable waters or construc-
tion of public works, considered necessary and proper by the United States officers
supervising such improvement or public work: Andprovidedfurther, That the Secretary
of the Army, whenever in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers anchorage and naviga-
tion will not be injured thereby, may permit the deposit of any material above mentioned
in navigable waters, within limits to be defined and under conditions to be prescribed by
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hibits the deposit of material on the bank of any navigable water or
tributary where the material could be washed into the water by tides,
storms, floods or otherwise whereby navigation may be impeded.19
The section exempts operations in connection with the improvement of
navigation or construction of public works considered necessary by the
supervising officers of the United States.20 The Secretary of the Army
is authorized under Section 13 to permit deposits of such material
whenever in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers anchorage and
navigation will not be affected.2 1 Under the Clean Water Act, how-
ever, no permits for discharges under Section 13 may be issued.22 Per-
mits for such discharges are now issued by the Environmental
Protection Agency (hereinafter referred to as EPA) under the National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (hereinafter referred to as
NPDES). 23 While the permitting aspects of Section 13 are no longer in
force, Section 13 remains a viable mechanism for prohibiting
discharges.24
In order to implement the provisions of Sections 9, 10 and 13 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, the Secretary of the Army has dele-
gated considerable authority to the Chief of Engineers of the Army
Corps of Engineers and his representatives to issue or deny authoriza-
tions.2" The Corps has promulgated regulations governing the imple-
mentation of Sections 9, 10 and 13 consistent with this delegation of
authority in conjunction with its authority under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act.26
These regulations incorporate extensive coordination requirements.
Prior to a final decision by the Corps under the Act, the agency pro-
vides public notice of the proposed activity to affected and interested
parties, including a variety of federal and state agencies with whom
him, provided application is made to him prior to depositing such material; and when-
ever any permit is so granted the conditions thereof shall be strictly compiled with, and
any violation thereof shall be unlawful.
19. Id For a discussion of the issue of whether there must be an effect on navigation see
United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973) and Reserve Mining Co. v.
E.P.A., 514 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1975).
20. 33 U.S.C. §407 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
21. Id
22. Id §1342(a)(5).
23. Id §1342.
24. United States ex rel Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556, 559 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
25. 33 C.F.R. §325.8 (1980). The structure of the Army Corps of Engineers is a three-tier
system: (1) Office of the Chief of Engineers; (2) division offices; (3) district offices. The histori-
cal foundation for the authority of the Army Corps of Engineers in the area of water resources
dates back to the early days of the country when West Point was the only engineering school in
the country. When Congress became interested in regulating and improving the waterways, it
naturally turned to the Army.
26. Id §§320-329.
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coordination is required.27 The coordination process is designed to as-
sure that relevant information and opinion may be assimilated in the
evaluation of the proposed activity.
THE CLEAN WATER ACT
As a result of increasing national awareness of the environment and
particularly of the need to further protect the nation's waters, Congress
passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972.28 After some fine tuning and clarification of the legislation, Con-
gress amended the statute, renaming it the Clean Water Act of 1977.29
The purpose of the Clean Water Act is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the nation's waters. 30 Ex-
cept in accordance with its provisions, the Act makes unlawful the dis-
charge of any pollutant from a point source into the waters of the
United States.3 This mandate is consistent with Section 13 of the Riv-
ers and Harbors Act of 1899, but the scope of the Clean Water Act is
broader.
The definition of waters of the United States under the Clean Water
Act extends to all waters which may be regulated by Congress under
the commerce clause.32 Under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, the
jurisdictional scope is limited to navigable waters of the United States;
this term encompasses less than the full constitutionally allowable terri-
torial jurisdiction.3 3 Under the Clean Water Act, the term "navigable
waters" means the waters of the United States including the territorial
seas.34 As a result, there are two definitions of navigable waters for
regulatory purposes. The first, under the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899, refers to those waters of the United States which are subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide shoreward to the mean high water mark
and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be
susceptible to use to transport interstate or foreign commerce.35 Under
the Clean Water Act, waters of the United States refers to all waters
which can be regulated under the commerce clause, including the terri-
torial seas, navigable waters, tributaries to navigable waters and their
27. Id §325.3.
28. 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977,
PUB. L. No. 95-217, §§1-72, 91 Stat. 1567.
29. 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
30. Id §1251(a).
31. Id §1311(a).
32. United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345,347 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1970).
33. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1299 (5th Cir. 1976).
34. 33 U.S.C. §1362(7) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
35. 33 C.F.R. §322.2(a) (1980).
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adjacent wetlands and other waters such as isolated wetlands and lakes,
intermittent streams, prairie potholes and other waters that are not part
of a tributary system to interstate waters or to navigable waters of the
United States, the degradation or destruction of which could affect in-
terstate commerce.36
Responsibility for administering the Clean Water Act is divided be-
tween the Administrator of the EPA and the Secretary of the Army.
The Administrator of the EPA is charged with the responsibility of es-
tablishing effluent limitations for point sources37 and for issuing
NPDES permits for the discharge of pollutants from point sources.38
In granting NPDES permits, the Administrator is empowered to pre-
scribe conditions for the permits in order to assure compliance with the
other parts of the Clean Water Act, including the effluent limitation
provisions.3 9 In addition, the Act provides a mechanism for states to
take over the responsibility for issuance of NPDES permits after com-
plying with requirements to insure an adequate program.40
The Secretary of the Army is given responsibility for issuing permits
for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites (Section 404 permits).41 The Secretary may ei-
ther issue individual permits or may issue general permits on a state,
regional or nationwide basis for any category of activities involving the
discharge of dredged or fill materials.42 The states may take over par-
tial administration of the 404 permit program.43
In the case of a NPDES permit or 404 permit, the authorization may
not be issued until there has been notice and an opportunity for a pub-
lic hearing.' The purpose of the public notice is to advise interested
parties of the proposed activity and to solicit comments and informa-
36. Id; 40 C.F.R. §122.30 (1980).
37. 33 U.S.C. §1311(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
38. Id. §1342(a); see United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734 (D.C. Del. 1981).
39. 33 U.S.C. §1342(a)(2). (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
40. Id §1342(b). Problems can arise under this system with concurrent State-Federal en-
forcement. United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734 (D.C. Del. 1981).
41. 33 U.S.C. §1344(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Traditionally a development oriented
agency, the Corps accepted its new environmental role with some ambivalence. Blumm, Wetlands
Protection and Coastal Planning: Avoiding the Perils of Positive Consistency, 5 COLUM. J. OF
ENVT'L L. 69, 71 (1978). While other agencies were reluctant to implement the policies of NEPA,
however, the Corps made a concerted effort to comply with both the spirit and the letter of the
law. D. MAZMANIAN & J. NIENABER, CAN ORGANIZATIONS CHARGE: ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, AND THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS, vii. The Corps is now in the
position of catching fire from environmentalists for not doing enough to protect the environment
while at the same time being accused by others of strangling development.
42. 33 U.S.C. §1344(a), (e) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
43. Id §1344(g).
44. Id §§1342(a)(1), 1344(a); 33 C.F.R. §325.3 (1980) (Corps); 40 C.F.R. § 124.10-12 (1980)
(EPA).
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tion necessary to evaluate the probable impact on the public interest.45
Generally, the determination of whether a public hearing is to be held
depends on a request made by a member of the public in response to
the public notice, but in some instances the necessity for a hearing may
depend on whether there are material facts which are in dispute.46
As with the issuance of permits under the Clean Water Act, enforce-
ment is the responsibility of both the Administrator of the EPA and the
Secretary of the Army. After the issuance of a compliance order, the
EPA may institute a court action for violations of the Act, including a
violation where a state has responsibility for administering the NPDES
permit program.47 The Corps may institute proceedings against a party
for a violation of Section 404.48 Civil and criminal-penalties as well as
injunctive relief are available to remedy violations of the Act.4 9
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
In order to declare a national policy encouraging the productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment, 50 Congress
passed the National Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter referred to
as NEPA),51 declaring the policy of fulfilling the responsibilities of
each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding genera-
tions.52 In order to effectuate this policy, NEPA established the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality (hereinafter referred to as CEQ)5 3 and
also established procedural requirements to insure that federal agencies
would consider environmental factors in decision processes. 54 Both the
establishment of CEQ as a federal environmental coordinating agency
and the mandate to consider environmental effects of proposed actions
are important to the management of the nation's waters.
The duties of the CEQ are to: (1) assist and advise the President in
the preparation of environmental quality reports for submission to
Congress; (2) gather information concerning the conditions and trends
in the quality of the environment; (3) to review and appraise the vari-
ous programs and activities of the Federal Government in the light of
45. United States v. Alleyne, 454 F. Supp. 1164, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), quoling 33 C.F.R.
§209.120(j)(1) (1976); see 33 C.F.R. §325.3 (1980).
46. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Costle, 586 F.2d 650, 658-59 (9th Cir. 1978).
47. 33 U.S.C. §1319 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See generally United States v. Little Rock
Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6 (D.C. Ark. 1978).
48. 33 U.S.C. §1344(s) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Seegenerall, United States v. Weisman, 489
F. Supp. 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
49. 33 U.S.C. §§1319(c), (d), 1344(s)(4) (1976 & Supp. I 1979).
50. 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
51. Id §§4321-4347.
52. Id §4331(b)(1).
53. Id §§4341-4347.
54. Id §4332.
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NEPA policy for the purpose of determining the extent to which such
programs and activities are contributing to the achievement of such
policy; (4) to develop and recommend to the President national poli-
cies to foster and promote the improvement of environmental quality;
(5) to conduct investigations, studies, surveys, research and analysis re-
lating to ecological systems and environmental quality; (6) to report to
the President on the state of the environment; and, (7) to furnish stud-
ies, reports, and recommendations with respect to matters of policy and
legislation as the President may request.5
As suggested by these various duties, CEQ is not essentially in itself a
decision-making organization. 6 Although the Council does have some
authority to formulate regulations regarding procedural and adminis-
trative matters, it has no authority to mandate a final decision by an
agency. Rather, CEQ serves the role of monitoring the programs and
activities of federal agencies without generally participating in the deci-
sions involved. 8
The cornerstone of NEPA's procedural regiment is the environmen-
tal impact statement (hereinafter referred to as EIS). The preparation
of an EIS is not the only procedural mandate of NEPA, but an EIS
does serve as the principal mechanism for insuring that the Federal
Government complies with the underlying policy of the Act. The re-
quirement of an impact statement effects NEPA's express purpose to
imbed an early formal consideration of the environment in the decision
process.5 9 An environmental impact statement performs two primary
functions: (1) to serve as an environmental disclosure statement by de-
tailing the environmental effects of a proposed federal action in order
to enable those who do not have a part in its compilation to understand
and consider meaningfully the factors involved;60 and, (2) to compel
the decision maker to give serious consideration to environmental fac-
tors in making discretionary choices and to help insure the integrity of
55. Id §4344.
56. For a discussion of CEQ's limited role as an arbitrator under its regulations see McDer-
mott, Improving NEPA: New Regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality, 8 B.C. ENVr'L
AFF. L. REv. 89 (1979).
57. For example, the CEQ has issued regulations outlining the procedures and format to be
used for preparing environmental impact statements. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1980). The regula-
tions were issued under the authority of Exec. Order No. 11514 (1970), as amendedby Exec. Order
1191 (1977).
58. In emergency circumstances which make it necessary for an agency to take action which
will have significant environmental effects without observing the procedural requirements of
NEPA the agency should consult with CEQ but even in such cases, there is no provision for CEQ
to make the final decision on how the agency should proceed to comply with NEPA. 40 C.F.R.
§1506.11 (1980).
59. Citizens for Responsible Area Growth v. Adams, 477 F. Supp. 994, 998 (D.N.H. 1979).
60. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1136 (5th Cir. 1974).
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the process of decision by precluding stubborn problems or serious crit-
icism from being swept under the rug.6'
The most critical requirement of the EIS process is to reasonably
investigate and consider the effects of a proposed action. In arriving at
a decision, NEPA mandates that the decision maker be well informed.
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NDC,62 the Court ob-
served that NEPA is designed to insure a fully-informed and well-con-
sidered decision.63 This in turn requires information, coordination and
analysis.
Information regarding the effects of a proposed action may come
from several sources including the agency, an applicant for a permit or
license, consultants, other local, state or federal agencies, and from
members of the public. To insure an integrated use of the natural and
social sciences and the environmental design arts, impact statements
must be prepared using an inter-disciplinary approach. 6 In addition,
the lead federal agency may call upon other federal agencies which
have jurisdiction or special expertise for assistance as cooperating
65agencies.
The importance of an early and open method for identifying signifi-
cant issues is recognized by the scoping process. This consists of an
early public notice in the Federal Register of intent to prepare an EIS,
followed by participation of interested persons and agencies to narrow
and focus the issues to be considered. 6 The scoping process can serve
to allocate assignments for the preparation of the EIS among the lead
and cooperating agencies and identify other environmental statements
or assessments related to the action. Consultation requirements can be
identified, timing planned, and page limits set to assist in the prepara-
tion of a useful document.
Because one of the reasons behind the EIS process is a recognition of
the desirability to open up the information gathering process, it is im-
portant that interested members of the public be given an opportunity
to express their opinions and to input information for consideration by
the agency. Beyond the scoping process, this involves providing notices
to persons and organizations who are affected by the action or who
have expressed an interest.67 Public hearings or public meetings are
61. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282,
1285 (1st Cir. 1973); Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 (2d
Cir. 1972).
62. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
63. Id at 588.
64. 40 C.F.R. §1502.6 (1980).
65. Id §1501.6.
66. Id §1501.7.
67. Id §1506.6(b).
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appropriate in instances where there is substantial environmental con-
troversy or substantial interest is expressed in holding a meeting or
hearing.68
The analysis of the information for inclusion and discussion in the
EIS is not to be a pro-forma exercise. An EIS should serve as a deci-
sion tool and not as a device to pay lip service to NEPA. This requires
that an EIS realistically address the substantive issues while at the same
time avoid detailed discussion of the trivial. Too often in the past the
EIS was a telephone directory of facts. The length of a document is no
guarantee of its value, and in fact, a bloated statement may indicate a
failure to engage in a meaningful analysis of the issues.69
The final step in the NEPA process is the decision itself. In order to
provide an understanding of why a particular decision was made, the
lead agency prepares a record of decision indicating which alternative
is preferred on environmental grounds and discussing perferences of
alternatives based upon other factors including economic and technical
considerations and agency statutory missions.7" NEPA requires good
faith consideration of environmental factors and not just formalistic
paper shuffling,7' but the decision is not dictated by these factors alone,
nor are they necessarily elevated above other considerations.72 The
Supreme Court has observed that "once an agency has made a decision
subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is
to insure that the agency has considered the environmental conse-
quences; it cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the
executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.' ,7"
FISH AND WILDLIFE COORDINATION ACT
Whenever the waters of a stream or other body of water are pro-
posed or authorized to be impounded, diverted or otherwise controlled
or modified by a federal agency or department or by others under a
federal license or permit, the department or agency is required first to
consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine Fish-
eries Service as appropriate, and the state wildlife agency. 74 This coor-
dination is to be accomplished with a view to the conservation of
wildlife resources as well as providing for the development and im-
68. Id §1506.6(c).
69. See 43 FED. REo. 55,978 (1978) (comments on Section 40, Code of Federal Regulations,
Section 1502.7-page limits).
70. 40 C.F.R. §1505.2 (1980).
71. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1129 (1974).
72. Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
73. Id at 227-28, noting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
74. 16 U.S.C. §662(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1970, 3 C.F.R., reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. app. at 397 (1970).
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provement of these resources in connection with water-resource
development.75
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act7 6 establishes a national
policy
recognizing the vital contribution of our wildlife resources to the Na-
tion, the increasing public interest and significance thereof due to ex-
pansion of our national economy and other factors, and to provide
that wildlife conservation shall receive equal consideration and be
coordinated with other features of water-resource development pro-
grams through the effectual and harmonious planning, development,
maintenance, and coordination of wildlife conservation and rehabili-
tation .... 77
The scope of the implementation of this policy has been addressed
by the Supreme Court in Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n.78 In that
case, the Commission awarded a private company a license to construct
a hydroelectric power project on the Snake River, concluding that the
project should not be developed either by the Federal Government or
by a public power supply system. The Court ruled that the issue of
federal development was never explored by the Commission and that it
should explore all issues relevant to the public interest in this regard,
including the wildlife conservation aspect under the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act.79 In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the
Commission's inquiry regarding the project should not stop at its use-
fulness to the proponent or even the needs of the region, but must in-
clude an exploration of all issues relevant to the public interest
including the protection of wildlife.8 0
While not enlarging the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers under
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, it is clear that under the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act, Congress intended that the Corps would
consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service before issuing a permit for a
private dredge and fill operation.8" The Senate Report on the Act
noted that nursery and feeding grounds of valuable crustaceans and
fishes may be affected by dredging and filling operations and that prior
to the Act, existing law had no application to dredging and filling of
bays and estuaries by private interests.82
75. 16 U.S.C. §662(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
76. Id §§661-666(c).
77. Id §661; see Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428, 443 (1967).
78. 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
79. Id at 443, 450-51.
80. Id at 450.
81. United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 607 (1974).82. S. REP. No. 1981, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3446-3450.
1982 / Water Resource Management
EPA has a duty to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service in con-
nection with the issuance of NPDES permits.83 The fact that NPDES
permits are exempted from the full requirements of NEPA84 renders
the consultation requirement of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act especially important. Under the Clean Water Act, the protection
of and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife is a goal.86 This goal
is consistent with, and is to be read in conjunction with the similar
policy under the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.87
A significant feature of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act is
that federal agencies authorized to construct or operate new water-con-
trol projects are authorized to modify or add to the structures and oper-
ations of these projects and to acquire lands in order to accommodate
the means and measures for conservation of wildlife resources as an
integral part of the projects.88 The Act provides that the cost attributa-
ble to the development and improvement of wildlife shall not extend
beyond that necessary for land acquisition, facilities recommended in
water-resource project reports, modification of the project and modifi-
cation of project operations but shall not include the operation of wild-
life facilities.8 9 These mitigation measures of the Act have proven to be
an integral part of planning water-resource projects.
In some instances conflicts have arisen concerning whether an
agency has fully complied with its responsibilities under the Act. The
focus of such cases often revolves around the question of mitigation.
One such case that examines the issue of mitigation is Cape Henry Bird
Club v. Laird.90 The case concerned the construction of Gathright
Dam on the Jackson River in Virginia by the Army Corps of Engi-
neers. The project was an earth and rock-fill dam creating a lake which
would remove about twelve miles of the Jackson as a free-flowing river.
The purpose of the dam was for flood control and water quality con-
trol. The plaintiffs contended that the Corps had not complied with the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act because there was no plan to miti-
gate the loss of the Gathright area to the Virginia Commission of
Game and Inland Fisheries. The plaintiffs argued that under the Act
the Corps had a duty to mitigate the loss to the state.91 A large portion
of the area acquired for the project was originally part of a wildlife
83. 40 C.F.R. §122.12(e) (1980).
84. 33 U.S.C. §1371(c)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
85. Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train, 532 F.2d 280, 290 (2d Cir. 1976).
86. 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
87. 532 F.2d at 290.
88. 16 U.S.C. §662(c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
89. Id §662(d).
90. 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va. 1973).
91. Id at 417.
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management area owned by Virginia. The plaintiffs alleged that the
amount paid to the state for the land was inadequate, thereby resulting
in a failure of the Corps to fully mitigate the loss of the wildlife area to
the state. The court determined that it was not its duty to decide
whether the price was adequate, finding that the determination was one
to be made solely between the Corps and the state. 92 The court also
refused to interject itself into the agreement between the State and the
Corps regarding other mitigation measures to be taken.93 The court
observed that the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act only requires
that the Corps attempt to mitigate losses by discussing and consulting
with the appropriate state and federal agencies. Although the Corps
may recommend mitigation plans to Congress, it has no authority to
provide for mitigation under the Act in the absence of specific congres-
sional authorization.94
The limits of an agency's responsibility to provide mitigation were
also explored in Akers v. Resor95 where the plaintiffs sought to stop
construction of a channel enlargement and realignment of the Obion
and Forked Deer Rivers in Tennessee. Pursuant to the Fish and Wild-
life Coordination Act, the Corps submitted a mitigation report to Con-
gress. That report was not in accordance with a mitigation
recommendation made by the Fish and Wildlife Service, with the
Corps commenting that the Service's recommendation to reduce the
channel work was incompatible with the flood control purpose of the
project and that the alternate recommendation to acquire 12,500 acres
of land for the use of the Game and Fish Commission was not econom-
ically justifiable. Later, the Corps prepared another mitigation plan in-
cluding a proposal to acquire 14,400 acres for mitigation purposes. The
plan had not yet been submitted to Congress. By that time, however,
the Tennessee Game Commission was contending that 44,425 acres
should be acquired, and the Fish and Wildlife Service was urging that
even more acreage should be acquired. The new mitigation plan of the
Corps was also declared inadequate by the Bureau of Recreation of the
Department of the Interior, the United States Forest Service and the
Tennessee Health Department.
Plaintiffs contended both that the Corps failed to consult in good
92. Id
93. The type of mitigation measures agreed to are illustrative. They included: the grant of a
long-term or permanent license to the Commission for the use of a lodge; providing vehicular
access in designated areas; providing for hunter usage of a buffer strip around the lake; setting
aside some timber area for fish propagation purposes, purchasing six downstream access points for
future licensing to the Commission, and; granting responsibility for regulating fish and wildlife
activities and boating on the lake to the Commission. Id. at 417.
94. Id
95. 339 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
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faith with the other agencies and that the Corps could not proceed with
the project until a mitigation proposal had been tendered to Con-
gress. 96 The court stated that the legislative history of the Act contem-
plated that a plan of mitigation be submitted to Congress by the
construction agency when Congress is asked to appropriate funds for
the project even though the project had already been generally author-
ized.97 The court held that the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
must be administered in accordance with NEPA and that the Corps
must submit a mitigation plan to Congress before it proceeded. 98 In
considering the consultation requirement in relation to the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act, the court only said that the Corps must con-
sult in good faith with the other agencies and give their recommenda-
tions due consideration.99
The question of interplay between the Fish and Wildlife Coordina-
tion Act and NEPA has also been raised in relation to joint compliance.
The courts have generally accepted that if an agency complies in good
faith with NEPA, it will automatically take into consideration all of the
factors required by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act."°°
In addition to mitigation for federal projects, mitigation is sometimes
appropriate for private actions affecting fish and wildlife resources
where a permit is required. Because the issuance of these permits is
within the perview of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, mitiga-
tion can be a method for insuring that the issuance of a permit for a
private action is consistent with the policy of the Act. The decision in
Sierra Club v. Alexander' illustrates the process. Pyramid Company
wanted to develop a regional shopping mall in New Hartford. Because
part of the proposed site consisted of wetlands, the developer applied
for a federal 404 permit, in addition to state permits. In order to miti-
gate the destruction of the wetlands, Pyramid proposed measures in-
cluding detention basins to provide storm capacity and the creation of
some new wetlands. 102 After the public notice was issued by the Corps,
there was a meeting attended by representatives of the federal agencies
96. Id at 1380.
97. Id The court referred to S. REP. No. 1981, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1958] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3446.
98. 339 F. Supp. at 1380.
99. Id ,
100. Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 356 (8th Cir. 1972); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aj'd 470 F.2d 289
(8th Cir. 1972).
101. 484 F. Supp. 455 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
102. Exec. Order No. 11990, 42 Fed. Reg. 26961 (1977) states that
each agency shall provide leadership and shall take action to minimize the destruction,
loss or degradation of wetlands in carrying out the agency's responsibilities including
water resources planning and licensing activities. In accordance with this national policy
no permit is granted for work in important wetlands unless it is determined "that the
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and Pyramid. The meeting and mitigation procedures failed to satisfy
the Fish and Wildlife Service. The permit was issued over the un-
resolved objection. The court held that while the Corps had a duty to
consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service, it had no obligation to make
a decision which corresponded with the Fish and Wildlife Service
position.10 3
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The Endangered Species Act'0 plays an important part in the man-
agement of water resources. The motivation behind the Act is fourfold:
(1) various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States
have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth
and development untempered by adequate concern and
conservation;
(2) other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have been so depleted
in numbers that they are in danger of or threatened with extinction;
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecologi-
cal, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the
Nation and its people;
(4) the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the
international community to conserve to the extent practicable the
various species of fish or wildlife and plants facing
105extinction....
The Act requires the establishment of lists of endangered and
threatened species and the issuance of regulations for the conservation
of such species.' 06 In addition, the Act requires interagency coopera-
tion for the protection of endangered and threatened species and their
critical habitat.10 7
The interagency cooperation provisions of the Act affirmatively com-
mand all federal agencies to insure that actions authorized, funded, or
carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of an
endangered species or result in the destruction or modification of such
benefits of the proposed alteration outweigh the damage to the wetlands resource and the
proposed alteration is necessary to realize those benefits."
See 33 C.F.R. §320.4(b)(4) (1980).
103. 484 F. Supp. at 470.
104. 16. U.S.C. §§1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
105. Id §1531.
106. Id An endangered species means "any species which is in danger of extinction through-
out all or a significant portion of its range other than a species of Class Insecta. . . whose protec-
tion . . . would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man." Id §1532(4). A
threatened species means "any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the
forsecable fiture throughout al or a significant portion of its range." Id f§1532(15).
107. Id §1536.
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species. 10 8 In the snail darter case, Tennessee ValleyAuthority v. Hill, °9
the Supreme Court declared the prohibition to be absolute, allowing of
no exception. °10 The Court held that although the Tellico Dam had
been virtually completed, the project had to be abandoned because
filling the reservoir would destroy the critical habitat of the snail
darter.'
The decision prompted a strong reaction in Congress, resulting in
consultation and exemption procedures being added to the Act.'
1 2
Consultation between the Secretary" 3 and the agency is the first step in
the process of determining whether a proposed action violates the Act.
After the conclusion of that consultation period, the Secretary is re-
quired to provide to the action agency a written statement setting forth
the Secretary's opinion and a summary of information detailing how
the agency action affects the species or its critical habitat. If the opin-
ion is based on inadequate information, the federal agency has a con-
tinuing obligation to make a reasonable effort to develop that
information." 4 The actions that the agency can take during the period
when the information is unavailable may be limited, pending a more
complete evaluation.'1
If the Secretary's opinion is that the action would violate the Act, the
federal agency, the governor of the state in which the action would
occur, or the permit/license applicant may apply for an exemption. A
review board, comprised of an individual selected by the Secretary, a
resident of the affected state selected by the President and an adminis-
trative law judge, is appointed to investigate the situation and report to
the Endangered Species Committee." 6
The Endangered Species Committee is composed of seven members:
108. Id, as amended by Act of Nov. 10, 1978, PuB. L. No. 95-632, §3, 92 Stat. 3752 and Act of
Dec. 28, 1979, Pu. L. No. 96-159, §4, 93 Stat. 1226.
109. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
110. Id at 173.
111. Id at 172-73.
112. 16 U.S.C. §1536 (1976 & Supp. m1 1979), as amended by Act of Nov. 10, 1978, PuB. L.
No. 95-632, §3, 92 Stat. 3752 and Act of Dec. 28, 1979, PuB. L. No. 96-159, §4, 93 Stat. 1226.
These additions to the Act did not change the basic prohibition under Section 7. "The statutory
language cited in TVA . Hill remains unchanged, and the legislative history reflects Congressional
approval of the Supreme Court's approach in that case." North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F.
Supp. 332, 351 (D.D.C. 1980). The legislative history referred to is H. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong.
1st Bess. 13, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2577.
113. Secretary may mean the Secretary of Interior, Secretary of Commerce or Secretary of
Agriculture depending on the particular context. 16 U.S.C. §1532(10) (1976 & Supp. Int 1979).
114. H. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 12, reprinted h7 [1979] U.S. CODE CONo. & AD.
NEWS 2577.
115. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 352-53 (D.D.C. 1980).
116. The report of the review board is to address two issues: first, whether an irresolvable
conflict exists, and; second, whether the federal agency and the exemption applicant have carried
out their consultation responsibilities in good faith, making an effort to develop and fairly con-
sider reasonable modifications or alternatives. 16 U.S.C. §1536(g)(5) (1976 & Supp. I 1979).
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(1) the Secretary of Agriculture; (2) the Secretary of the Army; (3) the
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors; (4) the Administrator
of the EPA; (5) the Secretary of the Interior; (6) the Administrator of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and (7) an in-
dividual from each affected state, appointed by the President. The
committee is charged with making a final determination. The commit-
tee can grant an exemption if, by a vote of not less than five of its
members, it determines that: there are no reasonable and prudent al-
ternatives to the agency action; the benefits of the action clearly out-
weigh the benefits of alternative courses of action which would
conserve the species or its critical habitat; it is in the public interest; and
the action is of regional or national significance. The committee must
also establish reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures. The
consultation and exemption procedures provide a mechanism for con-
sidering unusual cases. It would be a mistake, however, to consider the
exemption procedure to be a viable method for escaping from the fun-
damental purposes of the Endangered Species Act. No exemptions
have been granted.'
17
THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT
The Coastal Zone Management Act (hereinafter referred to as
CZMA) I 8 focuses on the establishment of effective management, bene-
ficial use, protection, and development of the coastal zone.1 9 The im-
petus behind the CZMA is the realization that the coastal zone is a
valuable but fragile resource which must be managed.' 20 The idea of
management is the key to the Act. The Act does not establish specific
mandates for determining how this management is to be effected.
Rather, it establishes an opportunity for the coastal states to implement
their own management systems for the coastal zone, with an assurance
of cooperation from the Federal Government.1 2
1
117. The Tellico Dam was not granted an exemption by the committee. Recently, however,
snail darters have been found in several waterways in Texas. Wall St. J. Apr. 23, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
118. 16 U.S.C. §§1451-1464 (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
119. Id §1451(a). The term coastal zone means the coastal waters, including the underlying
land, and the adjacent shorelands and associated waters, strongly influenced by each other. It
includes islands, transitional and intertidal areas, salt marshes, wetlands and beaches. Id
§1453(1).
120. Id §1451.
121. Id §1451(h). The CZMA also states:
The Congress finds and declares that it is the national policy (a) to preserve, protect,
develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance the resources of the Nation's coastal
zone for this and succeeding generations, (b) to encourage and assist the states to exer-
cise effectively their responsibilities in the coastal zone through the development and
implementation of management programs to achieve wise use of the land and water
resources of the coastal zone giving full consideration to ecological, cultural, historic,
and esthetic values as well as to needs for economic development, (c) for all Federal
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A state coastal management program establishes broad guidelines on
priorities of uses in particular areas and a planning process for imple-
menting those guidelines."2 Essential to this is the necessity for a state
to have the authority to implement and enforce the program.123 By
establishing that it has the ability to manage its coastal resources, a
state is given the assurance that federal actions as well as private ac-
tions will be consistent with the state's coastal program.124
In many ways the federal consistency provisions are the focus of the
Act because they allow the state a significant measure of control which
it would not otherwise have. There are two components to the consis-
tency provisions. The first component is for federal activities and fed-
eral development projects. A federal activity is any function performed
by or on behalf of a federal agency, other than the issuance of a license
or permit."2 A federal development project is considered as a sub-
category of federal activity "involving the planning, construction, mod-
ification, or removal of public works, facilities, or other structures, and
the acquisition, utilization, or disposal of land or water resources." 26
The Act provides:
(c)(1) Each Federal agency conducting or supporting activities di-
rectly affecting the coastal zone shall conduct or support those activi-
ties in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable,
consistent with approved state management programs.
(2) Any Federal agency which shall undertake any development
project in the coastal zone of a state shall insure that the project is, to
the maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state
management programs.127
The second component is any activity requiring a federal license or
agencies engaged in programs affecting the coastal zone to cooperate and participate
with state and local governments and regional agencies in effectuating the purposes of
this chapter, and (d) to encourage the participation of the public, of Federal, state, and
local governments and of regional agencies in the development of coastal zone manage-
ment programs. With respect to implementation of such management programs, it is the
national policy to encourage cooperation among the various state and regional agencies
including establishment of interstate and regional agreements, cooperative procedures,
and joint action particularly regarding environmental problems.
Id §1452.
122. Id §1454(b).
The CZMA lists nine specific program requirements focusing on the need for an ade-
quate state organization and coordination of the program with relevant federal and state
agencies, local governments, regional organizations, port authorities and other interested
parties.
Id §1455(c)(1).
123. Id §1455(c)7).
124. For a discussion of the consistency provisions of the CZMA in relation to Section 404 of
the Clean Water Act, see generally Blumm, Wetlands Protection and Coastal Planning: Avoiding
the Pierils of Positive Consistency, 5 COLUM. J. OF ENV-frL L. 69 (1978).
125. 15 C.F.R. §930.31(a), (c) (1980).
126. Id §930.31(b).
127. 15 U.S.C. §1456 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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permit. An applicant for a license to conduct an activity affecting land
or water uses in the coastal zone must provide the federal agency with a
certification that the proposed activity complies with the state's pro-
gram.128 At the same time, the applicant submits a copy of that certifi-
cation with information concerning the activity to the state, providing
the state with an opportunity to review the activity for consistency with
its coastal zone program.12 9 The state then issues a public notice and
may hold a public hearing to assist it in determining whether it win
concur with the applicant's consistency certification. 130 If the state ob-
jects to the consistency certification, the federal agency may not issue
the license or permit, unless allowed to do so by the Secretary of
Commerce.13 1
There is a very significant difference between the consistency re-
quirements for federal activities and federal licenses or permits. For
federal activities, it is the federal agency which has primary responsi-
bility for determining whether its actions are consistent with the state
coastal program. 132 In addition, the federal agency is required only to
conduct the activity, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent
with the state program. For licenses and permits, however, the state
may determine that the proposed activity is not consistent with its pro-
gram, and the federal agency is bound by that determination unless it is
overruled by the Secretary of Commerce. Likewise, there is no limita-
tion that the activity must comply to the maximum extent practicable;
it must comply.'33 The CZMA provides an effective method to give a
state substantial control over its coastal resources while also insuring
that the state has a program which is capable of effective management.
It is notable that while outlining broad goals, the Act does not mandate
the standards which the states must use in their coastal programs. It is
an integral concept of the CZMA that the development and application
of such standards be left to the states rather than the Federal
Government.
ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL RESOURCES
Over the past several years, the consideration of cultural resources
128. 16 U.S.C. §1456(3)(A) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
129. 15 C.F.R. §§930.57-59 (1980).
130. Id §§930.60-63.
131. 16 C.F.R. §§930.65, 930.120-134 (1980). The Secretary may allow issuance of the permit
by determining that the activity is consistent with objectives and purposes of the CZMA or is
necessary in the interest of national security.
132. There is a mediation process available if the state disagrees with the determination of the
federal agency but it is not binding on the agency. 15 C.F.R. §§930.110-116 (1980).
133. Of course, the applicant may alter his plans to comply with the state coastal program
requirements.
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has become an integral part of the management of the nation's water
resources. The role of cultural resources is of particular importance to
water resource planning because sites of prehistoric and historic signifi-
cance are often located along waterways. Coordination of the cultural
resource aspects of a proposed activity is, therefore, a consideration
that must be addressed and integrated in the management process.
The National H-istoric Preservation Act (hereinafter referred to as
NIPA)'34 was passed to recognize that the historical and cultural foun-
dations of the nation should be preserved and to mandate a role for the
Federal Government in that preservation effort. 135 The NHPA autho-
rizes the Secretary of the Interior to establish a National Register of
sites, buildings, structures and objects which are significant in Ameri-
can history, architecture, archaeology and culture. 136 One of the signif-
icances of the National Register is that an agency having either direct
or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed activity must take into account
the effect on a National Register property. 137
This requirement has been translated into regulations by the Advi-
sory Council on Historic Preservation. 38 The regulations require a se-
ries of cultural resource milestones that must be met during the
consideration of water resource activities including both direct federal
projects and licensing or permitting processes. The responsibilities of
federal agencies include both the identification1 39 of cultural resources
and consideration of the effects on those resources.1 40
In order to accomplish these two objectives the process depends
heavily on coordination with those agencies which possess expertise in
cultural resources. In identifying properties which would be eligible
for listing on the National Register, the action agency is called upon to
consult with the state historic preservation officer. 14 1 The agency then
makes a determination of what further actions should be taken to iden-
tify previously undiscovered eligible properties. 42 This may include a
134. 16 U.S.C. §§470-470n (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
135. Id §470(b). The broad scope of the Act has been noted by the courts. See United States
v. 162.20 Acres of Land, 639 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1981).
136. 16 U.S.C. §470a (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
137. Id §470f.
138. 36 C.F.R. §800 (1979). The Advisory Council was established by Title 16, United States
Code, Section 470i. The regulations were issued pursuant to Title 16, United States Code, Section
470j and Executive Order 11593. The implementing regulations of the Corps of Engineers for
civil works projects are found at Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 305. The Corps
regulations for regulatory functions are in Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 325.
They are in accord with regulations of the Advisory Council.
139. 36 C.F.R. §800.4(a) (1979).
140. Id §800.4(b).
141. Id §800.4(a). A state historic preservation officer is the appropriate state official respon-
sible for cultural resources. Id §800.2(m) (1979).
142. Id §800.4(a)(2).
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cultural resources survey of the affected area.
If the identification process reveals eligible properties, the next step is
to determine the effect which the proposed undertaking will have on
the property. Again, the effect determination is made by the agency in
consultation with the state historic preservation officer. 14 3 Where the
agency determines that the proposed undertaking could have adverse
effects on an eligible property, an expanded consultation process kicks
in, requiring coordination with the Advisory Council as well as the
state historic preservation officer. This coordination process culminates
in a memorandum of agreement which outlines the action which will
be taken to avoid, mitigate or minimize adverse effects. 44
Also of particular application to water resource projects is the
Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act, 45 also known as the
Reservoir Salvage Act. The Act is designed to provide for the preser-
vation of historic and archaeological data which might otherwise be
lost or destroyed as the result of flooding or by alteration of the terrain
caused as a result of any federal construction project. 146 The Act re-
quires a federal agency to give written notice to the Secretary of the
Interior before undertaking an activity which could have adverse ef-
fects on historical or archeological data. The agency may request the
Secretary of the Interior to undertake recovery, protection and preser-
vation of the threatened data, or the agency itself may use funds appro-
priated for the project to provide recovery, protection and preservation
of the threatened data. 47 The Archaeological and Historic Preserva-
tion Act works in conjunction with the National Historic Preservation
Act to provide a comprehensive'system for coordination between agen-
cies responsible for water resource management and the Department of
Interior to insure appropriate consideration of cultural resources.
THE CONCEPT OF COORDINATION
Water resource management decisions are no longer made behind
closed doors. The effect of the laws discussed in this article has been to
open doors and build corridors of coordination. These corridors are
two-way conduits which serve to disseminate information from the
agency as well as allowing a flow of information and comment to the
agency. This process of coordination, properly designed and imple-
mented, is dynamic rather than static, encouraging a dialogue. In the
143. Id §800.4(b).
144. Id §800.6.
145. 16 U.S.C. §469-469c (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
146. Id §469.
147. Id §§469a, 469a-1.
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decision processes involving water resource activities it is important
that the decision maker receive input from a variety of sources, and it is
also important that the agency provide output.
Input and output are both part of the coordination process but they
serve basically different purposes. 148 The primary purpose of input is
to result in better decisions. 149 The ultimate standard of water resource
decisions is the public interest.150 In order to assure that decisions are
made in the public interest, the decision maker should have the benefit
of relevant information. While the individual making the decision and
his staff will generally have expertise in the area, it cannot be assumed
that they possess all relevant information. The input the decision
maker receives from other sources expands the information base by
providing new information and by providing information which may
contradict that which the decision maker already has.
The purpose of output is more complex. Initially, the purpose of
output in the coordination process is to provide notice to interested and
affected persons and organizations regarding the proposed water re-
source activity.151 This notice is important because it provides the
awareness necessary for those interested to be able to then provide in-
put to the process. The concept of output also serves to educate. This
is one of the key functions of an environmental impact statement.
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Not only are other agencies and the public notified of the existence of a
proposed activity; they are also provided detailed information regard-
ing the effects of the action and possible alternatives. This education
process in turn allows those interested or affected to provide better in-
put back into the system. Lastly, output serves to explain the reasons
for the decision after it has been made. 153
The first part of the coordination process is to provide initial notice
of the proposed activity. Because water resources affect so many differ-
ent elements of the society, the process of notifying appropriate indi-
viduals and organizations requires some consideration. The notice
should provide enough information concerning the proposal to assist
interested parties in evaluating its likely impact.1 54 It is also of assist-
148. 40 C.F.R. §1500.1(b) (1980).
149. One of the goals of the CEQ regulations ;s to foster better decisions, 43 Fed. Reg. 55978,
55979 (1978) (Summary of Major Innovations in the Regulations.) (This section was not codified
in the Code of Federal Regulations).
150. See 33 C.F.R. §320.4(a) (1980).
151. Sierra Club v. Alexander, 484 F. Supp. 455, 470-71 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); 33 C.F.R. §325.3
(1980); 40 C.F.R. §1506.6(a) (1980).
152. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813,819 (5th Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1136 (5th Cir. 1974).
153. 40 C.F.R. §1505.2 (1980).
154. 33 C.F.R. §325.3(a) (1980).
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ance for the notice to include a brief section on the factors which will
be used in evaluating the proposal. 155 Notices should be sent to con-
cerned federal and state agencies, local governmental bodies, interested
organizations and interested or affected parties.'
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After the public has been notified of a proposed activity, the coordi-
nation process shifts from output to a combination of output and input.
The mechanisms during this pre-decision stage vary and may include
correspondence, informal discussions, scoping meetings, public hear-
ings or public meetings. 57 These are tools designed to facilitate the
process of focusing the issues, assimilating information and formulat-
ing alternatives.
An important new feature at this stage of the coordination process is
the scoping process. Formally introduced by the CEQ regulations, the
concept of a scoping process is to increase efficiency in the decision
process.' 58 The scoping process is keyed to compliance with NEPA
and is defined as an "early and open process for determining the scope
of issues to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues re-
lated to a proposed action."' 59 By inviting early participation by inter-
ested parties, an agency is able to define the issues which are significant
and eliminate issues which are not significant or have been covered by
prior review. This allows an agency to focus its attention and concen-
trate on the essential, thereby reducing delay and saving money. Too
often in the past, environmental reviews of water resource projects con-
sidered insignificant effects in detail, resulting in voluminous docu-
ments which were, practically unusable by a decision maker. It has
now been recognized that an environmental statement is most effective
where it is short, precise and analytical.
One question that arises in regard to the information process con-
cerns the use of data which is prepared by consultants or by a permit or
license applicant. In many cases an agency does not have the resources
to perform a complete study of a proposed activity itself. Instead, the
agency or the applicant may contract with a consulting firm to prepare
a report for the agency. The courts have decided that this procedure is
proper if the agency makes an independent evaluation of the informa-
155. Id §325.3(b).
156. Id §325.3(c). In Sierra Club v. Alexander, 484 F. Supp. 455, 470 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), the
court noted the importance of the public notice requirement for a Finding of No Significant Im-
pact under NEPA. The court held that, although the Corps did not use the proper list in issuing
notices, the purpose of the notice requirements had been satisfied because there was substantial
public input.
157. 40 C.F.R. §1501.7 (1980).
158. Id
159. Id
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tion provided. 6 ' Because of the potential for pro-project bias in such
consultant reports, it is important for the agency to use a sharp eye in
its review to insure that information relied upon is accurate and suffi-
ciently complete.
THE ROLE OF CONSENSUS IN THE DECISION PROCESS
Consensus est voluntasplurium ad quo: res pertinent, simnuljuncta.'61
In examining the role of consensus in water resource management, it
is necessary to consider both aspects of the decision process: (1) the
formulation of policy; and, (2) the evaluation of individual projects.
In both aspects decisions must be made and in both aspects conflicts
arise.
Resources involving the waters of the United States are held in trust
by the Federal Government for the public benefit.162 This is the bed-
rock of all water resource policy: the public interest is paramount. 63
This simple axiom degenerates, however, into a tangle of conflicting
values when it becomes necessary to consider what constitutes the pub-
lic interest. In practice, water resource management is guided by vari-
ous component policies, each with its particular application and
emphasis.'6" These policies are established in statutes, executive orders
and regulations.
The formulation of these component policies is a continuing process
which is influenced by the shifting winds of public opinion, political
leadership, economic conditions and organizational pressures. The im-
petus behind policy formulation has come from a variety of sources,
each with an individual concept of the public interest. To some extent
these competing interests can be reconciled by balance and compro-
mise but in some instances policy aims are mutually exclusive.
This type of confrontation is illustrated by the basic issue of regula-
tion by the Federal Government. On one hand there exists the funda-
mental concept of private ownership and control of private property. 65
On the other hand is the desire to insure uses that are consistent with
the public interest. 66 This issue manifests itself in cases which must
delineate the duties of the Government while protecting individual
160. Sierra Club v. Alexander, 484 F. Supp. 455, 467 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); East 63rd Street Ass'n
v. Coleman, 414 F. Supp. 1318, 1328 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1976).
161. Consent is the conjoint will of several persons to whom the thing belongs. BLACK's LAW
DicTioN~AY 276 (5th ed. 1979).
162. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591-92 (1922).
163. See 33 C.F.R. §320.4(a)(1) (1980).
164. This is demonstrated by the several statutes described in the text accompanying notes 4-
143 supra.
165. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
166. See general, United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1949).
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property rights. The decision of the Supreme Court in Kaiser-Aetna v.
United States 167 demonstrates the complex nature of the endeavor. In
that case the Corps of Engineers sued Kaiser-Aetna, a development
corporation, seeking a declaratory judgment that there was a right of
public access to a pond which had been developed by the defendant.
The pond was contiguous to a navigable bay in Hawaii but was sepa-
rated from the bay by a barrier beach. Kaiser-Aetna had notified the
Corps that it planned to dredge the pond and to construct a channel
connecting the pond to the bay. The Corps acquiesed in the proposals.
After the work had been accomplished a dispute arose concerning
whether Kaiser-Aetna was required to obtain a permit from the Corps
under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 for future work
and whether Kaiser-Aetna could deny public access to the pond.
The majority opinion held that the pond was a navigable water of
the United States and that while the Corps could exercise jurisdiction
over the pond it could not require Kaiser-Aetna to allow public access
without paying just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 6 8 The
Court stated that the consent of the Corps created expectancies includ-
ing a right to exclude which could only be taken away under the emi-
nent domain powers of the Government.169 A strong dissent argued
that the doctrine of navigational servitude require the right of public
access to all navigable waters. 170
Aside from the specific holding of the case, Kaiser-Aetna demon-
strates the basic complexity of water resource management policy and
the type of significant questions which have remained unanswered.
Faced with a fundamental constitutional policy issue, the Court was
unable to achieve a consensus in its decision. Instead, the majority
opinion is fragmented, without a clear definition of the scope of the
holding. The dissent reveals an undisguised antipathy for the majority
opinion. Kaiser-Aetna is a poignant lesson of the lack of consensus in
water resource policy, even with respect to fundamental principles.
Consensus is also elusive when individual project decisions are
made. There are primarily two reasons for this. First, water resource
policies are usually general and as a result leave considerable room for
interpretation and judgment in their application. It is not surprising
that the coordination process usually reveals substantial differences in
the interpretation of the meaning and application of water resource
policies to the decision at hand. Because many policy components are
167. 444 U.S. 164 (1972).
168. Id. at 180.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 180-192 (Blacknian, J. dissenting).
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not quantifiable, the weight given to the components depends on the
discretion of the decision maker.171 Second, despite intensive engineer-
ing and scientific efforts, the factual analysis of water resource activities
also depends on judgment. Although some effects can be identified and
predicted reliably, others lie beyond the scope of scientific certainty.172
Decision makers, like policy makers, must face a variety of conflicting
input and must make decisions where compromise is not able to
achieve consensus.
Aside from the question of whether consensus can be achieved is the
issue of how much emphasis should be placed upon its pursuit.173 A
reasonable effort to achieve a consensus signals an evaluation process
which is receptive to the consideration of alternatives and modifica-
tions. It also demonstrates that information and opinion from more
than a single source are being considered. When seen in this perspec-
tive consensus can be a valuable tool in water resource management.
At the same time it must be recognized that consensus is not in itself
the ultimate goal and that its blind pursuit can be manipulated for pur-
poses of delay and to force decisions which are not in the best interests
of the public. A party sensing an unfavorable decision may suggest a
continuing series of proposals, counter-proposals and meetings, hoping
to delay the decision as long as possible. A decision maker who places
undue emphasis on consensus can be manipulated into an ad infinitum
merry-go-round.
An additional problem with an inflexible search for consensus is that
it can lead to weak decisions. This can happen where an objector to a
proposed project is bought off by an agreement to incorporate a sug-
gested modification even though the decision maker realizes that the
benefits of the modification do not justify the cost. Such unwarranted
modifications may be adopted, not because they are considered to be in
the public interest, but because their acceptance is the easy course of
action. The reason why consensus may be so sought after, even where
the result is not necessarily the best available, is because a party who
does not agree with a decision may make life difficult for the decision
maker by filing a lawsuit, instigating unfavorable press against the de-
cision or bringing political pressure to bear.
Consensus has a legitimate role in the decision process when it is
recognized as a part of the overall goal of reaching decisions which are
171. See 33 C.F.RL §320.4 (1980).
172. For a discussion of the complexity of determining the effects of a project see generally
Florida Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 506 F. Supp. 350 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
173. While the Endangered Species Act requires a consensus, there is no such requirement ifi
the other statutes previously discussed. See text accompanying notes 4-143 supra.
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in the public interest. It is, however, the public interest, not the consen-
sus itself which is the ultimate goal.174 By recognizing this, various in-
terest groups can be given the opportunity to provide input to the
coordination process and a reasonable effort can be made to achieve
agreement. If agreement is not reached after a reasonable period of
time, a decision should be made, recognizing any outstanding objec-
tions. 175 This role of consensus both expedites decisions and places em-
phasis on the public interest.
CONCLUSION
The importance of water resource management has been recognized
by a series of federal statutes, regulations and court decisions devel-
oped in response to the needs of the nation. One of the most notable
aspects of the policy formulated by these laws and decisions is the con-
cept of coordination. Coordination serves a dual purpose of providing
input to the decision process and at the same time opening up the pro-
cess to scrutiny by the public.
Although the decision maker retains discretion for judging the merits
of a proposed project, the process mandates a hard look and thorough
analysis before a decision is made. It requires that the information re-
lied upon and the reasons for the decision be disclosed.
The public interest rather than consensus is the governing standard.
Reasonable efforts to achieve consensus can assist the decision process
by encouraging consideration of modifications which would improve
the proposed activity. Where the consensus rabbit is pursued without
consideration of the associated "costs" the result may be delay and de-
cisions which mandate unwarranted project changes. In order to avoid
an unreasonable emphasis on consensus, the decision maker must be
willing to withstand heat from unsatisfied opponents. The recognition
of consensus as tool, rather than as the ultimate goal, ties water re-
source decisions more closely with the public interest.
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174. 33 C.F.R. §320.4 (1980); see Sierra Club v. Alexander, 484 F. Supp. 455, 470 (N.D.N.Y.
1980).
175. 33 C.F.R. §325.8 (1980) (establishes the authority of Corps officers to issue permits over
the unresolved objections of other federal agencies).
